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CASENOTE
ProCD, INC. V. ZEIDENBERG AND
ARTICLE 2B: FINALLY, THE
VALIDATION OF SHRINKWRAP LICENSES
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you have created a new computer program.' Parts of
the program are protected by copyright law. 2 However, other parts are a
compilation of public information 3 and may not be protected by intellectual property law. Undeterred, you seek to protect the uncopyrighted
information, which you obtained through time-consuming effort, via a
written license attached to each package of the software you sell. 4 The
1. This hypothetical situation was adapted from ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d
1447 (7th Cir. 1996), where Judge Easterbrook wrote the opinion allowing for enforcement
of the shrink-wrap license at issue.
2. See Subject Matter of Copyright, 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994).
3. See also Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1239, 1265-70 (1995) (describing the conflict that may appear between shrinkwrap licenses and intellectual property protection). But see Karen Puhala The Protectionof
Computer Software Through Shrink-wrap License Agreements, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1347, 1348-49, 1349 n.4 (1985) (discussing the failure of "traditional means of protection
through copyright, trade secret and patent laws... to provide sufficient protection of proprietary interests in software." See generally Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv.
Co., 499 U.S. 340, 364 (1991) (holding that some compilations of fact do not come under the
umbrella of copyright protection); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S.
141, 156 (1989) (holding that state law may not interfere with the public's right to economic
benefits from the most efficient method of manufacturing unpatented articles); S.O.S., Inc.
v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1088 (9th Cir. 1989) (interpreting terms of a contract to be
consistent with the policies of copyright law); see, e.g., S. MANDELL, COMPUTERS, DATA
PROCESSING AND THE LAW 5, 124-36 (1984) (discussing the appropriateness of alternative
means of protection for software); J. SoA, COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAw 22, 24
(1983) (stating that traditional means of protecting software are inadequate).
4. This type of license is called a shrink-wrap license or a "box-top" license, among
other labels. The purpose of shrink-wrap licenses is to "retain software title in the publishers, thereby giving publishers the right to determine the uses to which their software may
be put." Michael G. Ryan Offers Users Can't Refuse: Shrink-Wrap License Agreements as
Enforceable Adhesion Contracts, 10 CARDOzo L. REv. 2105, 2109 (1989); see also Tim Alan
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terms of the license essentially state that anyone who purchases the
software is prohibited from reselling the software or its contents, and
that offenders will be subject to legal action. 5 Through good fortune, you
6
manage to make a handsome profit from the legal sale of your software.
However, you soon find out that the information you have worked diligently to compile into your software is now available on the Internet 7 at
a fraction of the amount you charge to consumers.8 What are your options against the infringer?
Covington, The Future of Shrinkwrap Licenses (visited Feb. 4, 1997) <http'/l
www.fenwick.com/pub/future.html> (discussing "shrinkwrap," "tear open," and "box top"
licenses); David W. Maher, The Shrink-wrap License: Old ProblemsIn A New Wrapper, 34
J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 292, 295 (1987) (stating that "shrink-wrap" licenses are also
called "box top" or "tear-open" licenses); David Einhorn, Comment, The Enforceability of
"Tear-Me-Open" Software License Agreements, 67 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 509
(1985) (describing "shrink-wrap" licenses as "tear-me-open" and "blister-pack" licenses).
See generally Carey R. Ramos & Joseph P. Verdon, Shrinking and Click-On Licenses After
ProCDv. Zeidenberg, 13 COMPUTER LAw. 1 (1996) (discussing "shrink-wrap" licenses and
computer screen "click-on" licenses); Robert Gomulkiewicz & Mary L. Williamson, A Brief
Defense of Mass Market Software License Agreements, 22 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J.
335 (1996) (discussing end-user license agreements ("EULAs")); David L. Hayes, Shrinkwrap License Agreements: New Light on a Vexing Problem, 15 HASTINGS COMMJENT. L.J.
653 (1993) (describing a "shrink-wrap" license); James T. Peys, Commercial Law-The Enforceability of Computer 'Box-Top' License Agreements Under the U.C.C., 7 WHITTIER L.
REV. 881 (1985) (describing "box-top" license agreements in relation to the U.C.C.).
5. See D.C. Toedt, III, Shrinkwrap License Enforceability Issues, 453 PLI/PAT 613,
645-54 (1996) (showing a sample license agreement); Thomas M.S. Hemnes, Restraints on
Alienation, Equitable Servitudes, and the Feudal Nature of Computer Software Licensing,
71 DENY. U. L. REV. 577, 600-06 (1994) (displaying a sample licensing agreement and discussing history of licensing); Gary W. Hamilton & Jeffrey C. Hood, The Shrink-Wrap License-Is It Really Necessary?, 10 COMPUTER LAw. 16 (1993) (describing usual terms of
shrink-wrap licenses); see also Richard H. Stern, Shrink-wrap Licenses of Mass Marketed
Software: Enforceable Contracts or Whistling in the Dark?, 11 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH.
L.J. 51 (1985) (describing typical clauses in shrink-wrap licenses).
6. See Gomulkiewicz & Williamson, supra note 4, at 336-37 (discussing the heavy
costs associated with writing EULAs). The high resource costs of making shrink-wrap
licenses are due to "in-house lawyer and paralegal time, outside counsel fees, product management efforts, manufacturing, foreign language translation, layout and printing, and the
materials on which the EULAs are printed." Id.
7. Internet is "any network that connects other networks ... [or] a large network of
this type that covers the U.S. and extends to Canada, Europe, and Asia, providing connectivity between governments, universities, and corporate networks and hosts." DICTIONARY
OF SCIENCE AND TECH. 1129 (1992) [hereinafter DICT. Sci. & TECH.]. A network is "a system
of communication through telephone lines, switches, and signal repeaters that connect all
users." Id. at 2. A network is also defined as a "loosely coupled group of functional units,
such as computers." Id. "The computers, called nodes of the network, exchange messages
over communication links." Id.
8. This particular scenario is taken directly from the ProCD case, but could happen
quite easily to any other software producer. See supranote 1 and accompanying text (discussing the fact that this hypothetical is take from ProCD,Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447
(7th Cir. 1996)).

19971

ProCD, INC. V. ZEIDENBERG & ARTICLE 2B

Before the decision in ProCDv. Zeidenberg,9 a person faced with this
dilemma would have no recourse at law. 10 However, after the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held shrink-wrap
licenses to be enforceable, 1 ' there is new hope for software producers to
12
prevent end-users from the unauthorized use of licensed software.
Furthermore, this decision provides a guideline for parties who enter
into Internet contracts since these types of contractual agreements deal
with the same, or similar, issues as those confronting shrink-wrap
licenses.' 3 Lastly, this case is buttressed by the proposed Article 2B of
the Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C."), which includes a section ex9. ProCD,86 F.3d at 1447.
10. This is based on the decisions from the case law prior to ProCDthat were declined
to enforce shrink-wrap licenses. See Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91,
105-06 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding warranty disclaimer provision of license agreement to be
unenforceable); Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 270 (5th Cir. 1988)
(holding that license agreement which prohibited decompilation or disassembly of plaintiffs program was unenforceable); Arizona Retail Sys., Inc. v. The Software Link, Inc., 831
F. Supp. 759, 766 (D. Ariz. 1993) (ruling that warranty disclaimer clause in license agreement was not enforceable); see also Steven A. Marenberg & Elliot Brown, 'Scope of Use'
Restrictions in Software Licenses, 10 COMPUTER LAw. 1, 2 (1993) (stating that the courts
have provided "neither certain nor uniform" answers to the restrictive "scope of use" provisions in software licenses). But see Puhala, supra note 3, at 1350-51 n.12 (discussing cases
decided before the rulings from Vault Corp., Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc., or Arizona Retail
Sys., Inc. were handed down which have upheld the enforceability of similar clauses in
software license agreements, such as limitation of liability clauses, forum selection clauses,
breach of contract clauses, and warranty disclaimer provisions).
11. ProCD,86 F.3d at 1455. In another recent opinion by Judge Easterbrook, the Seventh Circuit held that the terms of a clause in a sales agreement were binding on a purchaser who failed to return the faulty product before the 30-day warranty period ran out.
Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir. 1997), reh'g denied, (7th Cir. Feb.
3, 1997) (describing the clause as an arbitration clause). In fact, the opinion cites to ProCD,
among other cases, as authority for the proposition that "commercial transactions in which
people pay for products with terms to follow" are enforceable. Id. at 1148. A copy of the
arbitration clause is reprinted in the district court's opinion. See Hill v. Gateway 2000,
Inc., No. 96 C 4086, 1996 WL 650631, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 7, 1996), vacated, 105 F.3d 1147
(7th Cir. 1997) (compelling the plaintiffs to submit to arbitration on remand). As an aside,
Professor Raymond Nimmer brought the Hill case to this author's attention during Professor Nimmer's recent presentation on Article 2B. See Professor Raymond T. Nimmer, Remarks at The John Marshall Law School's 41st Annual Conference on Developments in
Intellectual Property Law (Feb. 27, 1997) [hereinafter Nimmer, Remarks] (noting that Professor Nimmer is the Leonard Childs Professor of Law at the University of Houston Law
Center and that he is currently the Reporter for the Drafting Committee on U.C.C. Article
2B-Licenses).
12. See Gomulkiewicz & Williamson, supra note 4, at 335. Shrink-wrap licenses will
allow software producers to prevent individuals from profiting from the producers' hard
work. Id.
13. Gary H. Moore & J. David Hadden, On-Line Software Distribution:New Life for
'Shrinkwrap'Licenses?, 13 COMPUTER LAw. 1 (1996) (forecasting the higher probability of
enforceability of on-line licenses as compared to the shrink-wrap licenses).
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14
pressly dealing with shrink-wrap licenses.

This Casenote sets forth the reasons why the ProCD decision is the
correct ruling. 15 In doing so, Part II of this Casenote lays out the facts
that led to the decision by the Seventh Circuit. Part III addresses the
issues and conclusions most troublesome to opponents of shrink-wrap
licenses. Part IV expounds upon the reasoning utilized in the Seventh
Circuit's ruling. 16 Part V details this Casenote's analysis of the decision
reached in ProCD. This Casenote argues that: (1) shrink-wrap licenses
should be valid due to licensing and contract considerations; (2) federal
copyright law does not preempt the terms of shrink-wrap licenses; and
(3) the proposed Article 2B is consistent with ProCD so as to fortify the
Seventh Circuit's ruling. Finally, in light of the explosion of Internet licensing agreements, Part VI urges the legislators revising Article 2B to
enact its timely provisions because the proposed changes will settle the
shrink-wrap quandary once and for all.
II. BACKGROUND
ProCD, Inc., ("ProCD") 1 7 is in the business of creating national di14. U.C.C. § 2B-208, Mass-Market Licenses (Proposed Draft, Sept. 25, 1997). See Lemley, supra note 3, at 1293-94 (displaying Section 2-2203 of the U.C.C. Revised Article 2 from
Oct. 8, 1994, which enunciates the guidelines for standard form licenses); Holly Keesling
Towle, Licensing and the Uniform Commercial Code, 454 PLI/PAT 353 (1996) (showing the
provisions of Article 2B that are apposite to mass market licenses, and discussing the history of Article 2B and how it is being drafted under "the joint auspices of the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL") and the American Law
Institute ("ALI)"); see also Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, Devising a Legal Framework
for Software Licensing: UCC Draft Article 2B (visited Feb. 4, 1997) <http://brownraysman.com/doclib/ucc.draft.html> (describing the revisions in Article 2B which affect mass
market licenses).
15. See ProCD,86 F.3d at 1447; see also Gomulkiewicz & Williamson, supra note 4, at
335 (arguing in defense of shrink-wrap licenses).
16. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Society, 106 YALE L.J.
283, 447-55 (1996) (discussing Judge Easterbrook's views on the relationship between contract law and copyright law); see also Hill, 105 F.3d at 1 (exemplifying Judge Easterbrook's
outlook in favor of contractual agreements). See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual Property is Still Property, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 108 (1990) (maintaining that
physical property and intellectual property should be given identical treatment). Neoclassicists would treat "literary and artistic works as 'vendible commodities,' best made subject
to broad proprietary rights that extend to every conceivable valued use." Netanel, supra,at
286.
17. ProCD, Inc. is incorporated in the state of Delaware and its principal place of business is in Danvers, Massachusetts. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640, 644 (W.D.
Wis. 1996), rev'd, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). ProCD has a World Wide Web site which
allows Internet users to order the directories ProCD creates. The Uniform Resource Locator ("URL") of the web site is <http://www.procd.com>.
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rectories of residential and business listings.' 8 The company spent millions of dollars to create these directories. 19 After compiling the
information, ProCD sold the directories on CD-ROM 20 under the trademark "Select Phone." 2 1 Each Select Phone product sold is packaged in a
box 22 that contains five CD-ROM disks 23 containing the program 2 4 and
18. ProCD,908 F. Supp. at 644. The facts from the record state that ProCD compiled
over 95 million residential and commercial listings from about three thousand publicly
available telephone books published nationwide to make Select Phone. Brief for Appellant
at 7, ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (No. 96-1139) [hereinafter
Brief for Appellant]. The listings include full names, street addresses, telephone numbers,
zip codes, zip-plus-four codes, and "SIC" codes, where appropriate. Id. at 6-7. "SIC" code is
the Standard Industrial Classification code of each business listing. Id.
19. Brief for Appellant, supra note 18, at 7. The approximate cost to ProCD of compiling the database was $10 million. Id. The Database is also quite expensive to keep current. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1449. ProCD engaged in price discrimination to maximize its
profits, which has allowed ProCD to charge a more affordable price to consumers, either via
the Internet or in computer stores, and a higher price to retailers and manufacturers. Id.
In 1995, the retail price for Select Phone was between $149 and $169. Brief for Appellant,
supra note 18, at 7. Due to the success of its products, ProCD's annual gross sales is about
$20 million. Id. "Price discrimination" is the practice whereby "[one] buyer pays a price
that is different from the price paid by another buyer for an identical product or service."
BLAciKs LAw DICTIONARY 1189 (6th Ed. 1990).
20. Brief for Appellant, supra note 18, at 7. ProCD utilizes a special compression technique that allows for storage of "vast amounts of data on a single CD-ROM disk by translating words into symbols and other codes." Id. The information actually stored on the CDROM disk is a complicated code, and not the words of the listings, that is "undecipherable
and generally useless to the user." Id. The "key' that unlocks the door to the listings is
ProCD's software, which translates the code and produces listings comprehensible to users
by converting the compressed code into properly formatted and fielded roman characters."
Id. CD-ROM is a "compact disc containing data that can be read by a computer[." MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 183 (10th ed. 1994); see also ProCD, 86 F.3d at
1449 (giving literal definition of CD-ROM as "compact disc-read only memory").
21. Brief for Appellant, supra note 18, at 6-7. ProCD has a copyright for the software
under registration number TX 4-024-766. Id. ProCD offers a "potentially cheaper" alternative to manufacturers and retailers, who pay high prices to "specialized information intermediaries" for such mailing lists. ProCD,86 F.3d at 1449. The database may also afford
consumers a more efficient method of accessing telephone numbers in other states. Id.
22. ProCD,908 F. Supp. at 645. The outside of each Select Phone box contains a note
that alerts the purchaser to the existence of a license agreement. Id. However, the specifics of the agreement are not displayed in the notice. Id. There is also a notice referring to
the License Agreement on each CD-ROM disk, as well as being printed in full in the User
Guide and under the "HELP" menu on each disk. Brief for Appellant, supra note 18, at 9.
23. Brief for Appellant, supra note 18, at 7. Each disk covers a geographic region of the
United States- e.g., Northeast, Central, South, Great Lakes, and Pacific. Id.
24. Brief for Appellant, supra note 18, at 8. The program conducts a search according
to the user's criteria, specifically by name, address, telephone number, SIC code, or any
combination thereof. Id. For instance, one criteria may be to "find all people named Tatum
in Tennessee, plus all firms with 'Door Systems' in the corporate name." ProCD,86 F.3d at
1449. The program also allows "end-users" to print and "download" the listings. Brief for
Appellant, supra note 18, at 8. To "download," in this instance, is to copy a listing from the
Select Phone TM CD-ROM disks. Id. at 8 n.5. "End-users" are another name for software
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the residential and business listings, 25 a User Guide, and a registration
card. The User Guide includes the terms of the "Single User License
Agreement" ("License Agreement"). 2 6 Moreover, once the program is installed into an end-user's computer, a notice reminds users that the License Agreement restricts the usage of the product and the data. 27 A full
refimd is guaranteed to users who believe they cannot or who do not
28
want to comply with the terms of the License Agreement.
purchasers. See Gomulkiewicz & Williamson, supra note 4, at 335 (labeling the software
user as an "end-user"). A more exact definition of "download" is "to transfer (data) from a
usufally] large computer to the memory of another device (as a smaller computer)." MErRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 349 (10th ed. 1994). A computer program is defined under U.S. law as a "set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly
in a computer in order to bring about a certain result." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994 & Supp. I).
The process of developing a program consists of three stages. Puhala, supra note 3,at 1347
n.1. The first stage comprises a "flow chart setting forth the logical steps involved in a
program." Id. The second stage is making the source program, which is a "translation of
the flow chart into a programming language that the programmer can read and understand." Id. The third stage forms the object program, which is a "translation of the programming language into machine language that the computer understands directly and
which enables the computer to execute the program." Id. Furthermore, the computer must
"translate the source program into the object program before it can execute the program."
Id. The two types of software are application software, which "performs a specific task,"
and operating system software, which "manages the internal functions of the computer or
facilitates the use of application software." Id. at 1348 n.1. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 117
(1994) (dealing with two circumstances where copyright law does not protect a computer
program, i.e., essential step and archival purposes).
25. See FeistPublications,Inc. v Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. at 340, 347 (1991)
(holding that telephone directories are not copyrightable because the compilation of facts
does not possess any "modicum of originality"). But see Brief for Appellant, supra note 18,
at 8 n.4 (asserting that the ability of Select Phone Tm to search by a variety of fields differentiates it from normal telephone books; plus, ProCD's product contains information, such as
ZIP and SIC codes, not covered in printed telephone directories).
26. ProCD,908 F. Supp. at 645. The license agreement explicitly states the following:
Please read this license carefully before using the software or accessing the listings contained on the discs. By using the discs and the listings licensed to you, you
agree to be bound by the terms of this License. If you do not agree to the terms of
this License, promptly return all copies of the software, listings that may have
been exported, the discs and the User Guide to the place where you obtained it.
Id.
27. Id. The terms depicted on the computer screen declare the following:
The listings contained within this product are subject to a License Agreement.
Please refer to the Help menu or to the User Guide[] .... The listings on this
product are licensed for authorized users only. The user agreement provides that
copying of the software and the data may be done only for individual or personal
use and that distribution.., is prohibited ....[Y]ou will not make the Software or
the Listings in whole or in part available to any other user in any networked or
time-shared environment, or transfer the Listings in whole or in part to any computer other than the computer used to access the Listings.
Id.
28. Brief for Appellant, supra note 18, at 9.
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In 1994, Matthew Zeidenberg 2 9 purchased Select PhoneTM at a retail
computer store. 30 Upon realizing that he could download data from Select Phone and make it available over the Internet for commercial purposes, 3 1 Zeidenberg purchased two more copies of the program. 3 2 Acting
upon his discovery, Zeidenberg started a company called Silken Mountain Web Services, Inc., ("Silken Mountain") to form a database that
could be used by Internet users to access telephone listings. 33 Silken
Mountain downloaded the telephone listings from ProCD's database and
34
from another company's database.
Though Zeidenberg saw the warnings on the computer screen, he did
not believe that the license terms were binding on him. 35 As a result,
Zeidenberg created his own computer program which allowed users of
29. ProCD,908 F. Supp. at 644. Zeidenberg is a graduate student who is presently,
and at all times relevant to the ProCD case, studying for a Ph.D. in computer science at the
University of Wisconsin-Madison. E-mail from Matthew Zeidenberg, defendant in ProCD
v. Zeidenberg, to Author of this Casenote (Feb. 27, 1997) (on file with author). See Brief for
Appellant, supra note 18, at 9 n.6 (stating that Zeidenberg had used hundreds of computer
programs with license terms similar to those of ProCD's).
30. ProCD,908 F. Supp. at 645.
31. E-mail from Matthew Zeidenberg, Defendant in ProCD v. Zeidenberg, to Author of
this Casenote (Mar. 3, 1997) (on file with author). Zeidenberg stated explicitly, "[n]either
Silken Mountain nor I made money. Both lost some [money]. I never charged for the use of
the page or the search engine: I hoped to make money off of advertising on the page, but
never did. Th[e] latter was my 'commercial purpose.'" Id.
32. ProCD,908 F. Supp. at 645. Zeidenberg bought the new versions of Select PhoneTM
in March 1995 and in April 1995, respectively. Id.
33. Id. Zeidenberg is the sole employee, officer, and shareholder of Silken Mountain.
Id. Zeidenberg also consulted with attorneys regarding his decision to incorporate Silken
Mountain. Record Appendix in Support of Brief for Appellant at 131-32, ProCD, Inc. v.
Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d. 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (No. 96-1139) [hereinafter Record Appendix].
Silken Mountain did not have any income during its existence; Zeidenberg provided the
company with the capital necessary to function daily. Id. at 132. Silken Mountain had a
Web site with the following URL: <http://bovine.ssc.wisc.edu:8080/phglimpse.html>. However, this site has since been deleted by Zeidenberg. E-mail from Matthew Zeidenberg,
Defendant in ProCDv. Zeidenberg, to Author of this Casenote (Feb. 10, 1997) (on file with
author). Zeidenberg stated that the site was left on the Web inadvertently after Silken
Mountain dissolved. Id.
34. ProCD,908 F. Supp. at 645. The name of the other company was Digital Directory
Assistance ("DDA") and the product used by Silken Mountain was Phone disc. See E-mail
from Matthew Zeidenberg, Defendant in ProCD v. Zeidenberg, to Author of this casenote
(Feb. 26, 1997) (on file with author). In a deposition of Zeidenberg, he admitted that he
"willfully took [ProCD's] listings in order to assemble [his] own database." Record Appendix, supra note 33, at 163 (detailing the deposition taken of Zeidenberg on October 17,
1995).
35. See Brief for Appellees at 4, ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996)
(No. 96-1139) [hereinafter Brief for Appellees]. Zeidenberg read the information regarding
the Feist decision which held telephone directory print to be excluded from copyright protection. See Record Appendix, supra note 33, at 31; see also ProCD, 908 F. Supp. at 645
(discussing the license terms on the computer screen).
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the program to search through ProCD's database. 36 In May 1995, Silken
Mountain contracted with Branch Information Systems ("Branch") to
gain access to the Internet. 37 Soon thereafter, Silken Mountain allowed
Internet users to access the database. 38 However, once ProCD learned of
Silken Mountain's exploits, ProCD demanded that Silken Mountain
cease its actions. 3 9 Zeidenberg responded with a letter admitting to
downloading ProCD's telephone list, but defiantly expressed his inten40
tions to continue this activity.
Branch halted its business relationship with Silken Mountain after
41
it was made aware of ProCD's disapproval of Zeidenberg's activities,
thus forcing Zeidenberg to find another Internet provider. Therefore, in
August 1995, Silken Mountain entered into another agreement with
Ivory Tower Information Services ("Ivory Tower") to gain access to the
Internet, whereby Internet users could use Silken Mountain's database
42
without charge.
ProCD filed suit against Zeidenberg and Silken Mountain in September 1995 in the United States District Court for the Western District
of Wisconsin requesting a preliminary injunction against Silken Mountain's activities. 4 3 The suit was based on claims under the Copyright
36. ProCD, 908 F. Supp. at 645. Silken Mountain had over 20,000 "hits" on the Internet daily, thus indicating the large number of people who are interested in this information. Record Appendix, supra note 33, at 136. This was the damage claimed by ProCD. Id.
The difference between ProCD's database and Silken Mountain's database was that the
latter's software program permitted searches based only on the name or industry code,
whereas ProCD's program could search numerous fields, such as name, address, telephone
number, area code, or zip code. ProCD,908 F. Supp. at 645.
37. ProCD, 908 F. Supp. at 645. Silken Mountain paid $1,000 to Branch for Internet
access at a monthly rate of $500, or $6,000 annually. Record Appendix, supra note 33, at
132.
38. ProCD,908 F. Supp. at 645. However, individuals who accessed Silken Mountain's
home page on the Internet did not use or copy the Select Phone software. Id.
39. Id.
40. Record Appendix, supra note 33, at 111 (displaying letter written by Zeidenberg to
ProCD's counsel in reply to letter written by ProCD's counsel demanding that Zeidenberg
and Silken Mountain cease activities that violated the shrink-wrap license agreement).
41. Brief for Appellees, supra note 35, at 6. Silken Mountain's Web page using
Branch's Internet service was only accessible by Internet users for a few days due to
Branch's fear of an impending lawsuit by ProCD. Id.
42. Id. Ivory Tower stipulated to allow Silken Mountain to gain access to the Internet
unless a court determined otherwise. ProCD, 908 F. Supp. at 645.
43. ProCD, 908 F. Supp. at 645-46; see also Brief for Appellant, supra note 18, at 26
(displaying the trial court's Order of Preliminary Injunction against Zeidenberg, Silken
Mountain, and Ivory Tower). Ivory Tower settled out-of-court with ProCD and was dismissed from the case. Id. at 5 n.2. Accordingly, the District Court permanently enjoined
Ivory Tower from allowing the information provided by ProCD to be accessible on the Internet. Id. at 30-31 (displaying the Final Order and Permanent Injunction of Oct. 23,
1995).
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Act,44 the Wisconsin Computer Crimes Act,4 5 and Wisconsin contract
and tort laws. 4 6 On January 5, 1996, the District Court granted both
47
Silken Mountain's and Zeidenberg's motions for summary judgment.
ProCD appealed the District Court's ruling. 48
III.

ISSUES & CONCLUSIONS OF THE PROCD COURT

In reversing the District Court's decision, the Seventh Circuit validated the enforcement of shrink-wrap licenses.4 9 The Seventh Circuit
delved into two issues: whether shrink-wrap licenses are enforceable and
50
whether shrink-wrap licenses are preempted by federal copyright law.
First, the court held that shrink-wrap licenses are enforceable, unless
some terms are "objectionable on grounds applicable to contracts in general." 5 1 Second, the court ruled that the shrink-wrap license at issue
was not preempted by the Copyright Act, deciding that state contract law
governs shrink-wrap licenses and not preempted by federal copyright
law. 52 As a result, shrink-wrap licenses are enforceable as long as the
53
terms of the license are reasonable.
44. See generally Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-10 (1994 & Supp. I) (defining the
federal copyright laws).
45. ProCD, 908 F. Supp. at 643.
46. Id.; see also Brief for Appellant, supra note 18, at 4 (stating that ProCD alleged
that Zeidenberg made "unauthorized copying and use of ProCD's copyrighted
software... in direct violation of the License Agreement governing the product") (emphasis
added). See generally Wisconsin Computer Crimes Act, Wis. STAT. § 943.70 (1996).
47. Brief for Appellant, supra note 18, at S.A. 25 (displaying the Summary Judgment
Order).
48. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 18, at S.A. 32 (displaying the Notice of Appeal
filed by ProCD on January 17, 1996).
49. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, Inc., 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). ProCD "is the first
case to consider directly the enforceability of shrinkwrap licenses in mass-market consumer transaction." Ramos & Verdon, supra note 4, at 3.
50. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1448-49.
51. Id. at 1449. Terms objectionable to contracts include violations of a "rule of positive law" or unconscionable contracts. Id. See generally Unconscionable Contract or
Clause, U.C.C. § 2-302 (1987) (defining what constitutes unconscionability).
52. ProCD,86 F.3d at 1454. See generally Preemption with Respect to Other Laws, 17
U.S.C. § 301 (1994) (stating that the Copyright Act preempts any law that comes within
the ambit of copyright protection).
53. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1448-49; Zeidenberg has decided that he will not appeal the
Seventh Circuit's decision. E-mail from Matthew Zeidenberg, defendant in ProCD v.
Zeidenberg, to Author of this Casenote (Feb. 2, 1997) (on file with author). Zeidenberg
stated that he did not believe he could obtain certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court and
that he was "burned out" from litigating the case, though he still insists that the Seventh
Circuit's holding was incorrect. Id.; see also supra note 51 (showing the examples given by
the Seventh Circuit as unreasonable terms).
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THE PROCD COURTS ANALYSIS

The Seventh Circuit's 54 analysis in ProCDfirst entailed determining
55
when, if at all, a contract was formed between ProCD and Zeidenberg.
Second, the court looked to whether the subject matter of the license
56
agreement was preempted by federal copyright law.

A. CONTRACT FORMATION
Like the District Court, the Seventh Circuit in ProCD treated the
license agreement as an ordinary contract accompanying the sale of a
product.5 7 Therefore, the Court ruled that the common law of contracts
58
and the Uniform Commercial Code to be the controlling bodies of law.
In regard to contract law, the Seventh Circuit first addressed the District
Court's reasoning that a contract was formed the moment the customer
paid for the software and exited the store.5 9 The court deduced, therefore, that the customer would also accept all of the terms accompanying
the sale of the software specifically, that the transaction was subject to a
license. 60 The Seventh Circuit stated that it would be impractical for a
vendor, such as ProCD, to put all of the provisions of the license on the
box containing the software. 6 1 Hence, ProCD chose to put the actual license agreement in two places: (1) printed fully in the User Guide, and
(2) encoded in each disk to be displayed prominently on the computer
screen once the user accessed the program. 62 As a matter of fact, the
user could not continue to download the program unless the user clicked
63
the screen assenting to the terms of the license.
54. The panel of the Seventh Circuit that heard the ProCD case consisted of Circuit
Judges Coffey, Flaum, and Easterbrook. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1448.
55. See id. at 1450-53 (dealing with the contract formation portion of the court's
holding).
56. Id. at 1453-55 (discussing the topic of preemption).
57. Id. at 1450. Judge Easterbrook further stated that the "legal differences between
'contracts' and 'licenses' (which may matter under the copyright doctrine of first sale) is a
subject for another day." Id. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640, 650-51 (W.D.
Wis. 1996) (discussing the overwhelming application of the U.C.C. to mass market software
licenses).
58. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1450.
59. Id.
60. Id. The court cited to Peeters v. State, 142 N.W. 181 (1913), in support of the proposition that a contract was formed the moment the purchaser paid for the product and left
the store. ProCD,86 F.3d at 1450.
61. Id. The Seventh Circuit agreed with the trial judge that a party to a contract cannot agree to hidden terms, but the terms in ProCD's license agreement was not hiddenthe terms were inside the software box and a notice on the outside of the box described the
existence of the license. Id.
62. Record Appendix, supra note 33, at 129-30.
63. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452.
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The court next analyzed the standardization of contracts. 64 In its
analysis, the court gave numerous examples of standardized contracts
where the "exchange of money precedes the communication of detailed
terms" such as the situation in ProCD.6 5 For example, when a buyer
purchases insurance, the insurance agent speaks with the buyer first,
then the buyer pays the agent, and, lastly, the policy and its terms are
sent to the buyer. 66 The court also described other types of situations
with similar agreements, such as the purchase of airline tickets, concert
tickets and consumer goods, including radio sets and over-the-counter
drugs. 67 Beside the obvious benefit to vendors, 68 the use of standardized
contracts "serves buyers' interests [as well] by accelerating effectiveness
and reducing transaction costs." 6 9 Moreover, the Seventh Circuit noted
that the customer's right to return the product for a refund if the cusbe a means of doing
tomer finds the "terms . . . unacceptable ... may
70
business valuable to buyers and sellers alike."
The Seventh Circuit looked to the type of sales that presently prevailed in the software industry. 71 Most software sales, the court noted,
occur via telephone orders, via Internet orders, or over the wire, with the
minority of sales taking place over-the-counter, where the software boxes
may be perused by the buyer. 7 2 At this point, the court referred to electronic sales where "there is only a stream of electrons, a collection of
64. Id. at 1451 (citing E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, 1 FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 4.26
(1990) and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS: STANDARDIZED AGREEMENTS § 211 cmt.
a (1981)). Comment a of Section 211 compares the standardization of agreements favorably to the standardization of goods and services, because the mandates of mass production
and distribution necessarily require standardization. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS: STANDARDIZED AGREEMENTS § 211 cmt. a (1981). The advantages of standardization are, inter alia, that "[o]perations are simplified and costs reduced, to the advantage of
all concerned." Id.; see also E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 4.26
(1982) (dealing with standardized agreements and also stating that standard forms "simplify operations and reduce costs").
65. ProCD,86 F.3d at 1451.
66. Id.
67. Id. The Seventh Circuit stated that it did not know of any states that disregarded
the warranties that accompanied consumer products dealing with occasions implied by the
U.C.C. when the contract was silent. Id.
68. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS: STANDARDIZED AGREEMENTS § 211 cmt.
a (1981).
69. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1451.
70. Id. at 1451. ProCD did, in fact, allow Zeidenberg, and other purchasers of ProCD's
software, to obtain a refund for returning the product if they did not agree with the terms
of the agreement. See supra notes 26 and 28 and accompanying text (discussing ProCD's
refund policy).
71. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1451-52.
72. Id. However, the facts of ProCD indicate that Zeidenberg purchased ProCD's
software at a retail store in an over-the-counter fashion. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing the fact that Zeidenberg purchased ProCD's software in a retail store).
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information that includes data, an application program, instructions,
many limitations, and the terms of sale."73 Then, the court criticized
Zeidenberg's argument that "unboxed sales are unfettered by terms so
the seller has made a broad warranty and must pay consequential damages for any shortfalls in performance," because the results of the argument are such that it would "drive prices through the ceiling or return
74
transactions to the horse-and-buggy age."
In its analysis of the U.C.C., the Seventh Circuit first disapproved of
the District Court's determination that the U.C.C. disfavors transactions
in which money changes hands before the terms are fully disclosed.7 5
The District Court relied on the argument that the American Law Institute ("ALI") and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws ("NCCUSL") 76 proposed the draft of Article 2B to encompass
standard-form user licenses because they believed that the present
U.C.C. does not validate shrink-wrap licenses. 77 The Seventh Circuit
countered this position by reasoning that "[t]o propose a change in a
law's text is not necessarily to propose a change in the law's effect. New
words may be designed to fortify the current rule with a more precise
text that curtails uncertainty."7 8 The court went on to conclude that,
given the large number of law review articles dealing with the status of
shrink-wrap licenses, 79 there is a strong need to reduce the uncertainty
on this topic.
The Seventh Circuit next addressed portions of the present version
of the U.C.C. that are appurtenant to shrink-wrap licenses.8 0 The first
section the court looked to was Section 2-204(1), which deals with formation of contracts.8 1 Given both that a vendor is the master of the offer
73. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1451-52.
74. Id. at 1452.
75. Id. The Court referred to the sequence in this type of transaction as "money now,
terms later." Id. Since the state of Wisconsin's version of the U.C.C. is not materially
different from the Official Version of the U.C.C., the Seventh Circuit used the numbering
system from the Official Version. Id.
76. See Towle, supra note 14, at 356 (describing the people involved in the NCCUSL).
The NCCUSL consists of four commissioners from every state, the District of Columbia,
Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Id. Commissioners usually are "law school
professors, legislators, practicing lawyers, and state code revisers" who are appointed by
the governor of each state. Id.
77. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452.
78. Id.
79. Id. See notes 3-5 and accompanying text (citing law review articles that discuss
shrink-wrap licenses). To prove this point, the Seventh Circuit referred to the paucity of
cases dealing with shrink-wrap licenses as a sign that businesses are less uncertain about
this topic than scholars. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452; see supra note 9 (discussing the three
cases prior to ProCD which deal with shrink-wrap licenses in one context or another).
80. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452.
81. Id. Formation in General, U.C.C. § 2-204 (1996) provides:
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and may invite acceptance by conduct, and that a buyer may accept by
performing the acts the vendor deems to qualify as acceptance, the court
concluded that Zeidenberg performed in a manner consistent with accepting ProCD's offer when he purchased the software and downloaded
the program.8 2 Furthermore, the court interpreted Section 2-204 to
mean that the U.C.C. allows contracts to be formed in ways other than
the conventional method of "paying the price and walking out of the
store."8 3 Again, since ProCD proposed another method for a buyer to
accept, and since Zeidenberg performed in a manner that complied with
the terms specified by ProCD, he accepted ProCD's offer.8 4 The contract
would not be formed, however, if the buyer returned the product due to
the buyer's conclusion that the terms of the license agreement made the
85
software worth less than the purchase price.
Next, the Seventh Circuit proceeded to discuss Section 2-60686 of the
U.C.C. The court interpreted Section 2-606(1)(b) to mean that a buyer
accepts goods when, after having an opportunity to inspect the goods, the
(1) A contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner sufficient to show
agreement, including conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of
such a contract.
(2) An agreement sufficient to constitute a contract for sale may be found even
though the moment of its making is undetermined.
(3) Even though one or more terms are left open a contract for sale does not fail for
indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a contract and there is reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy.
Id.
82. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452.
83. Id.
84. Id. In fact, Zeidenberg had to accept ProCD's terms in order for him to proceed in
downloading the program, because the computer program would not allow him to continue
unless he 'clicked' to accept the terms stated on the screen. See supra note 27 (displaying
the license terms shown on the computer screen).
85. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452. The Seventh Circuit stated that "[n]othing in the U.C.C.
requires a seller to maximize the buyer's net gains." Id.
86. Id. at 1452-53. What Constitutes Acceptance of Goods, U.C.C. § 2-606 (1996):
(1) Acceptance of goods occurs when the buyer
(a) after a reasonable opportunity to inspect the goods signifies to the seller
that the goods are conforming or that he will take or retain them in spite of
their non-conformity; or
(b) fails to make an effective rejection (subsection (1) of Section 2-602), but such
acceptance does not occur until the buyer has had a reasonableopportunity to
inspect them; or
(c) does any act inconsistent with the seller's ownership; but if such act is
wrongful as against the seller it is an acceptance only if ratified by him.
(2) Acceptance of a part of any commercial unit is acceptance of that entire unit.
Id.(emphasis added).
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buyer fails to make an effective rejection under Section 2-602(1).87 Applying this to the ProCD situation, the court reasoned that Zeidenberg
had the opportunity to return the software if he did not agree to the
terms of the license.88 Since Zeidenberg knew of the license and did not
return the software, he was thereby bound by the terms of the
agreement.8 9
Additionally, the Seventh Circuit discussed other requirements that
the U.C.C. imposes on parties entering into an agreement. 90 In doing so,
the court stated that, with the exception of the disclaimer of implied warranty of merchantability and the promise to make firm offers or to negate
oral modifications, other sections of the U.C.C. do not require vendors to
place conspicuous terms on the license. 9 1 Specifically, the court mentioned a forum-selection clause on the back of a cruise ship ticket in a
92
notable case in which an inconspicuous clause was held enforceable.
The court also asserted that Zeidenberg failed to find any case that required the terms of shrink-wrap licenses to be displayed prominently or
that have held that the ordinary terms of shrink-wrap licenses should be
"undercut rather than enforced." 9 3 As a result, the Seventh Circuit
equated the terms of a license as "conceptually identical to the contents
87. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452-53. "Rejection of goods must be within a reasonable time
after their delivery or tender. It is ineffective unless the buyer seasonably notifies the
seller." Manner and Effect of Rightful Rejection, U.C.C. § 2-602(1) (1996).
88. ProCD,86 F.3d at 1452-53. The Seventh Circuit observed that Zeidenberg had the
chance to inspect the software package, to try the software, and to read the license agreement, and yet, he did not reject the goods. Id. Further, the court stated that the U.C.C.
has always permitted parties to "structure their relations so that the buyer has a chance to
make a final decision after a detailed review." Id. at 1453.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.; see also Exclusion or Modification of Warranties, U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (1996) (stating that terms excluding or modifying the implied warranty of merchantability must be
conspicuous); Modification, Rescission and Waiver, U.C.C. § 2-209(2) (1996) (requiring parties to sign agreements indicating a modification or rescission when the initial agreement
so requires); Firm Offers, U.C.C. § 2-205 (1996) (mandating that terms allowing for a period in which the contract will be held open for the offeree must be signed by the offeror);
General Definitions, U.C.C. § 1-201(10) (1996):
"Conspicuous": A term or clause is conspicuous when it is so written that a reasonable person against whom it is to operate ought to have noticed it. A printed heading in capitals (as: Non-Negotiable Bill of Lading) is conspicuous. Language in the
body of a form is "conspicuous" if it is in larger or other contrasting type or color.
But in a telegram any stated term is "conspicuous." Whether a term or clause is
.conspicuous" or not is [to be decided] by the court.
Id. (emphasis added).
92. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1453; see Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585
(1991) (holding forum-selection clauses to be reasonable and enforceable, and that the
clauses do not violate the statute which prohibited depriving claimants of trial by a court of
competent jurisdiction).
93. ProCD,86 F.3d at 1453.
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of the package." 94 In this respect, the terms of use in a license agreement are a part of the product, just as the content of the database is a
part of the software. 9 5 The court closed its contractual analysis by stating that consumers in a market economy are protected when vendors
compete against each other, not when the judicial system revises the
96
package's contents.
B.

PREEMPTION

Following its analysis of contract formation, the Seventh Circuit
shifted its analysis to the preemption issue. Section 301(a) of the Copyright Act is the statutory provision which covers preemption. 9 7 First, the
court critiqued the District Court's conclusion that the data garnered by
ProCD was within the subject matter of copyright. 98 The court looked to
FeistPublications,Inc. v. Rural Telephone Services Co., Inc.99 in support
of its assessment that telephone listings were not original enough to
qualify for coverage under copyright. 10 0 The Court interpreted Section
301(a) to mean that states are prevented from "giving special protection
to works of authorship that Congress has decided should be in the public
domain, which it can accomplish only if 'subject matter of copyright' includes all works of a type covered by Sections 102 and 103, even if federal
94. Id. The court concluded that Wisconsin would not allow a buyer to pick and choose
among the terms of a license, just as no court would dare force ProCD to pick a certain
number of phone books or phone listings in forming a software program. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. The court stressed that adjusting the license terms in favor of Zeidenberg may
help him today, but would harm consumers in the long run because the price of software
would be increased to compensate for lost revenues due to copying of programs. Id.
97. Preemption with Respect to Other Laws, 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1994) which provides in
relevant part:
Aill legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights
within the general scope of copyright as specified by § 106 in works of authorship
that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come within the subject
matter of copyright as specified by §§ 102 and 103... are governed exclusively by
this title.
Id.
98. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1453.
99. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tele. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (holding
that some compilations of fact do not come under the umbrella of copyright protection).
100. ProCD,86 F.3d at 1453. The Seventh Circuit cited to numerous authorities for this
proposition. See Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 805 F.2d
663, 676 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that players' state law publicity rights are preempted); see
also PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 15.2.3 (2d ed. 1996); MELVILLE B. NrMmER & DAviD
NIMMEa, NrmMER ON COPvRIGHT § 101[B] (1995); and WuLLAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAw
AND PRACTICE 1108-09 (1994).
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law does not afford protection." 10 1
Then, the Seventh Circuit decided that the rights created by contract law are not equivalent to the general scope of rights exclusive to
copyright law.' 0 2 The court first held that contracts do not create exclusive rights because they pertain to the contracting parties only, whereas
the rights created by copyright law deal with strangers to the author, in
addition to the contracting parties. 10 3 An example of the compromise
between contract law and copyright law occurs when a person finds a
copy of Select Phone on the street. 10 4 This person would not be affected
by the shrink-wrap license, but would be restricted under the copyright
10 5
laws from copying or transmitting the program.
The court also looked at trade secrets, video rentals, and LEXIS
database usage. 1 0 6 In the case of trade secrets, the common customer
list is not copyrightable but is protected under the aegis of trade secret
law. 10 7 Moreover, contracts involving trade secrets may be enforced
since such contracts do not affect a stranger's independent discovery and
use of the secret.10 8 The court used the paradigm of videotape rentals to
show that a person who rents the video may not keep the tape by asserting that Section 301(a) makes the rental contract unenforceable. 10 9 In
addition, the court illustrated that a law student using the LEXIS
database may not contravene the contractual agreement with LEXIS
and resell such access to a law firm at a lower price than what LEXIS
would charge the firm. 110 The court used the preceding examples to
point out that Zeidenberg violated the agreement with ProCD by paying
the consumer price for the software when, in fact, he used the software
101. ProCD,86 F.3d at 1453. See generally Subject Matter of Copyright: In General, 17
U.S.C. § 102 (1994); Subject Matter of Copyright: Compilations and Derivative Works, 17
U.S.C. § 103 (1994).
102. ProCD,86 F.3d at 1454. The court sought assistance from three federal appellate
cases to support this proposition. See National Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Computer Assoc.
Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426, 433 (8th Cir. 1993); Taquino v. Teledyne Monarch Rubber, 893
F.2d 1488, 1501 (5th Cir. 1990); Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Swantz, 846 F.2d 923, 926 (4th
Cir. 1988).
103. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1454.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.; see also Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974) (holding that
federal patent laws do not preempt state trade secret laws).
109. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1454.
110. Id. The court cited to Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979), for
the proposition that "promises to pay for intellectual property may be enforced even though
federal law offers no protection against third-party uses of that property." ProCD,86 F.3d
at 1454.
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for commercial purposes.1 1 1 Since Zeidenberg used the software for commercial purposes, he should have been charged the higher commercial
11 2
price.
The court reasoned that courts normally read preemption clauses to
leave private contracts unaffected, even though Congress has the power
to preempt the enforcement of intellectual property contracts. 1 13 As an
example, the court used the preemption clause of 49 U.S.C.
§ 1305(a)(1) 1 14 to show that the rules respecting private choice, such as
contract law, are not preempted by a clause such as 49 U.S.C.
§ 1305(a)(1). Likewise, the court reasoned that Section 301(a) plays a
similar role to 49 U.S.C. § 1305(a)(1) because Section 301(a) "prevents
states from substituting their own regulatory systems for those of the
national government." 115 Since Section 301(a) does not interfere with
private transactions dealing with intellectual property, it follows that
Section 301 the Seventh Circuit feared labeling all contracts as falling
outside the coverage of the preemption clause because "the variations
and possibilities are too numerous to foresee." 1 6 But, the court still held
that enforcing shrink-wrap licenses like ProCD's would not interfere
1 17
with Section 301(a).
Lastly, the Seventh Circuit questioned whether ProCD's license
agreement withdraws information from the public domain. 118 The court
held that the license did not detract any information from the public
since anyone could still copy and disseminate the data from the myriad
telephone books used by ProCD. 1 19 In fact, the court deduced that enforcing shrink-wrap licenses would increase the amount of available information because software producers would be able to charge lower
prices to consumers. 120 Judge Easterbrook noted that licenses often ben111. ProCD,86 F.3d at 1454.
112. Id. See supra note 19 (discussing ProCD's use of price discrimination).
113. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1454 (citing American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 115 U.S. 219
(1995)).
114. Id. at 1454-55. The relevant portions of § 1305(a)(1) state that a federal statute
preempts any state "law, rule, regulation, standard, or other provision... relating to rates,
routes, or services of any air carrier." Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 49 U.S.C.
§ 1305(a)(1) (1994).
115. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1455.
116. Id. The court recognized that some contracts may interfere with Section 301 (a)
when the court analyzed the reasoning from Wolens, 115 U.S. 219, and National Car
Rental, 991 F.2d at 426.
117. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1455.
118. Id.
119. Id. The same applies to the SIC codes and ZIP codes. Id.
120. Id. The court also stated that licenses serve the same "procompetitive functions
as ... the law of trade secrets" because licenses "facilitate the distribution of object code
while concealing the source code." ProCD,86 F.3d at 1455 (citing Rockwell Graphic Sys.,
Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 180 (7th Cir. 1991)).
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efit the buyer because the vendor will permit the buyer to "make extra
copies, to use the software on multiple computers, .. . [and] to incorpo12
rate the software into the user's products." '
The court concluded its analysis by reiterating the holding that "a
simple two-party contract is not 'equivalent to any of the exclusive rights
122
within the general scope of copyright' and therefore may be enforced."
V.

AUTHOR'S ANALYSIS

The analysis section of this casenote consists of two main arguments. First, this casenote scrutinizes ProCD and shows that the Seventh Circuit's enforcement of shrink-wrap licenses is a sound decision.
Second, this casenote analyzes how proposed Article 2B of the U.C.C.
supports ProCD in validating shrink-wrap licenses. After the analysis
portion of this casenote is completed, the validity of shrink-wrap licenses
will be apparent and the soundness of the ProCDholding will be evident.
A.

THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT'S VISIONARY DECISION

In analyzing the Seventh Circuit's ruling, Part V Al first shows how
contract formation under the U.C.C. validates shrink-wrap licenses.
Next, Part V A.2 examines and dispels the notion that federal copyright
law preempts shrink-wrap licenses. As a result, this casenote demonstrates why ProCD's validation of shrink-wrap licenses are a valid and
enforceable method to protect software.
1.

The Uniform Commercial Code Allows For ProCD's Shrink-Wrap
License

Although the classification of shrink-wrap licenses has been troublesome, 123 the Seventh Circuit's ruling in ProCD has done much to clarify
121. ProCD,86 F.3d at 1455.
122. Id.
123. Deborah Kemp, Mass Marketed Software: The Legality of the Form License Agreement, 48 LA. L. REv. 87, 95 (1987) (stating that commentators argue in favor of applying
Article 2 of the U.C.C. to shrink-wrap license terms). Classifying shrink-wrap licenses as
either a license or a sale will change the legal implications of the agreement. Id. One
commentator has even called the use of a "license" in trade secret shrink-wrap agreements
to be a legal fiction for the protection of software producers. Lemley, supra note 3, at 1244.
The enforceability of shrink-wrap licenses had been considered doubtful, especially before
the ProCD decision was handed down. See Hayes, supra note 4, at 669; David A. Rice,
Public Goods, Private Contractand Public Policy: Federal Preemption of Software License
ProhibitionsAgainst Reverse Engineering, 53 U. Prrr. L. REV. 543, 562 (1992) (describing
the difference between a license and a sale); Susan J. Bahr, The Canadian Computer
Software Copyright Law: One Small Step for U.S. Software Vendors, 17 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 139, 162 (1991) (stating that the decision in Vault Corp. v. Quaid
Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988), "blurred the distinction between licensees and
owners").
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this problem. 124 The court in ProCD examined the shrink-wrap license
in the view of contract law for the reasons stated in the opinion.' 25 Despite the fact that both the Seventh Circuit and trial court applied the
U.C.C. to the shrink-wrap license involved in the case, 126 each court utilized different portions of the U.C.C. in their respective analyses. 12 7 As a
124. See supra note 122 and accompanying text (discussing the holding of ProCD).
Though it is true that ProCD's holding only applies to the states within the jurisdiction of
the Seventh Circuit, the case will still be a valuable guide to courts in other jurisdictions.
See Toedt, supra note 5, at 628.
125. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (discussing the Seventh Circuit's similar
use of the trial court's analysis of shrink-wrap licenses by looking to the U.C.C.); see also
Architectronics, Inc. v. Control Sys., Inc., 935 F. Supp. 425, 431-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (using
reasoning similar to the ProCDcourt in stating that Article 2 of the U.C.C. is applicable to
licenses, as well as contracts); ProCD, Inc., v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640, 650-51 (W.D.
Wis. 1996) (stating sound reasons for applying the U.C.C. to shrink-wrap licenses); cf
Kemp, supra note 124, at 100 (construing Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film
Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 498 (1917)) (reasoning that "the content of an agreement rather
than its name determines whether the parties are in fact engaged in a sale [s]
transaction").
See generally Page M. Kaufman, Note, The Enforceability of State 'Shrink-wrap' License
Statutes in Light of Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd., 74 CORNELL L. REV. 222, 233-35
(1988) (tracing the use of licensing agreements in computer software to deal with potential
violations of trade secrets).
126. See supra note 126 and accompanying text (discussing the Seventh Circuit's agreement with the trial court to use U.C.C.).
127. See Step-Saver Data Sys., 939 F.2d 91 (holding disclaimer of warranty terms to be
unenforceable because the terms were known to the licensee only after the software package was shipped to the licensee); Arizona Retail Sys., 831 F. Supp. 759 (dealing with disclaimer warranties in two sets of agreements, and ruling that the first set of agreements
were enforceable because the licensee had an "opportunity to review" the license terms, but
refusing to enforce the second set of agreements since the terms were not disclosed to the
licensee upon each shipment); see also Hayes, supra note 4, at 659 (describing the StepSaver court's application of Section 2-207 to the software program because software should
be considered a "good" under the U.C.C.); Moore & Hadden, supra note 13, at 3 (detailing
the Step-Saver court's analysis of Section 2-207). Compare ProCD,86 F.3d at 1452-53 (analyzing U.C.C. Sections 2-204, 2-606, and 2-602), with ProCD,908 F. Supp. at 652 (utilizing
U.C.C. Sections 2-207 and 2-209, and citing Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. WYSE Tech., 939
F.2d 91 (3rd Cir. 1991) and Arizona Retail Sys., Inc. v. The Software Link, Inc., 831 F.
Supp. 759 (D. Ariz. 1993), as support for applying those sections). See generally Einhorn,
supra note 4, at 517 (predicting that Section 2-207 "might ultimately control software mail
order transactions"). However, both courts in Step-Saver and Arizona Retail realized that
there is a difference between conspicuous notice of license terms made available to the
licensee before the contract is formed and alerting the licensee as to the existence of a
license after contract formation. Step-Saver, 939 F.2d at 104-05; Arizona Retail, 831 F.
Supp. at 763-64. The Seventh Circuit in ProCDdid not follow this line of analysis because
the court reasoned that Step-Saver dealt with "battle of the forms" and that Arizona Retail
"found that the buyer knew the terms of the license before purchasing the software."
ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452. See generally Additional Terms in Acceptance or Confirmation,
U.C.C. § 2-207 (1996) (determining when a contract is formed in situations where forms are
sent between the parties); Modification, Rescission and Waiver, U.C.C. § 2-209 (1996) (stating that "ain agreement modifying a contract within this Article needs no consideration to
be binding").
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result, each court came to diametrically opposing decisions in the
case. 128 In addition, although this casenote agrees with the application
of common law contracts and the U.C.C. to validate shrink-wrap
licenses, there are others who would hold shrink-wrap licenses invalid
based on the theory that purchasers have not assented to the terms of
shrink-wrap licenses.' 29 Indeed, the Seventh Circuit propounded the
more persuasive argument.
An analysis of whether a shrink-wrap license constitutes a valid contract entails defining contract formation. 130 Just as the Seventh Circuit
did in ProCD,13 1 this Casenote will look to the U.C.C. to accomplish this
analysis. Furthermore, other sources have also analyzed shrink-wrap li13 2
cense enforcement using provisions of the U.C.C.
128. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (discussing the Seventh Circuit's reversal of trial court decision).
129. See Lemley, supra note 3, at 1248-53. See generally Offer and Acceptance in Formation of Contract, U.C.C. § 2-206 (1996); Additional Terms in Acceptance or Confirmation, U.C.C. § 2-207 (1996); Modification, Rescission and Waiver, U.C.C. § 2-209 (1996);
and What Constitutes Acceptance of Goods, U.C.C. § 2-606 (1996).
130. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 (1988) (defining offer, acceptance and
consideration as the traditional means of contract formation).
131. See supra Part iv.a (discussing the Seventh Circuit's approach in analyzing contract formation).
132. One commentator has performed four types of analyses under the U.C.C. to determine when acceptance takes place in shrink-wrap license situations. See Kemp, supranote
124, at 106-08. Those four types are the following: (1) the vendor seeks to modify the original sale by denying completion of the sale; (2) the act of breakingthe seal or shrink-wrap is
acceptance of the offer of the license agreement; (3) the "sending of the software accompanied by the license agreement may constitute a conditional acceptanceof the user's offer to
purchase;" and (4) the vendor's "advertisement is the offer, and the user's order is the acceptance." Id. (emphasis added). Another commentator interpreted shrink-wrap licenses in
three different ways: (1) conditions subsequent to sale, (2) reverse unilateral contract, and
(3) conditions precedent to sale. Einhorn, supra note 4, at 513. The first interpretation is
generally frowned upon by courts because '[clonditions subsequent cause a forfeiture of
contract rights which are otherwise due and enforceable." Id. The second interpretation is
basically an "offer of a performance for a promise, rather than an offer of a promise for a
performance." Id. This interpretation is unworkable because the 'purchaser would be relinquishing rights in return for no further consideration from the publisher." Id. at 514.
Lastly, the third interpretation may be viable if 'adequate notice of the license terms is
provided to the consumer before the money is paid... [thereby allowing the purchaser to]
manifest acceptance of a conditional offer." Id. The commentator proceeded to criticize the
third possibility on the basis that most consumers 'do not receive adequate notice that use
of the software will be limited by the terms of a license." Id. However, the ProCD situation
is not vulnerable to this critique since ProCD's software package included a notice that a
license was included with the program which limited the purchaser's use of the software.
See supra note 22 and accompanying text (discussing the notice on ProCD's software package); Raymond T. Nimmer et al., License ContractsUnder Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code: A Proposal, 19 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 281, 292 (1993) (stating that
numerous cases have concluded that software agreements are 'transactions in goods treatable under the U.C.C. sales article"); see also Michael Schwarz, Tear-Me-Open Software
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A contract could have been formed at two junctions in the relationship between ProCD and Zeidenberg. The first instance of contract formation is when Zeidenberg purchased the software at the retail store.
Section 2-204(1) of the U.C.C. allows contracts to be formed in "any manner sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both parties
which recognizes the existence of such a contract." 133 Thus, as the
ProCD court reasoned, a contract was formed between ProCD and
Zeidenberg when Zeidenberg purchased ProCD's software at a retail
computer store.134
Moreover, at the time Zeidenberg purchased the software, he also
implicitly purchased the terms and conditions that were contained in the
software package. 135 One such condition was the shrink-wrap license
which described a purchaser's rights and limitations in using the
software. 13 6 This logic is reasonable when considering, as the Seventh
Circuit did, other types of transactions with similar circumstances. 13 7 In
particular, the Seventh Circuit looked to insurance policy agreements,
138
airline ticket and concert ticket purchases.
License Agreements: A Uniform Commercial Code Perspectiveon an Innovative Contract of
Adhesion, 7 COMPUTERJL.J. 261, 265-66 (1986) (concluding that "ready made software
should be regarded as 'goods' for the purposes of a U.C.C. analysis"); Graham P. Smith,
Shrink-wrap Licenses in Europe After the EC Software Directive, 11 COMPUTER/L.J. 597,
606 n.2 (1992) (stating that the "Louisiana statute was found to be unenforceable... [and
that] [t]he Illinois statute was repealed"); Rice, supra note 124, at 565-66. But cf Hayes,
supra note 4, at 661 (stating that the Step-Saver court rejected the conditional acceptance
theory). The second interpretation is the type that was adopted by the states of Illinois and
Louisiana when both passed Software License Enforcement Acts. Kemp, supra note 124, at
106-07. However, both states' Acts have been abrogated. See ProCD, 908 F. Supp. at 65556 (stating that Illinois repealed its law and that Louisiana's statute was partially invalidated by the Fifth Circuit in Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir.
1988)); see generally Vault, 847 F.2d at 269-70 (holding the Louisiana Act to be preempted
by federal law).
133. Formation in General, U.C.C. § 2-204(1) (1996). In addition, Section 2-206 (1)(a)
states that, "[uinless otherwise unambiguously indicated by the language or circumstances
an offer to make a contract shall be construed as inviting acceptance in any manner and by
any medium reasonable in the circumstances." Offer and Acceptance in Formation of Contract, U.C.C. § 2-206(1) (1996).
134. See supra note 81 and accompanying (discussing the Seventh Circuit's reasoning
regarding Section 2-204 of the U.C.C.).
135. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (discussing the Seventh Circuit's reasoning on this matter).
136. See supra notes 26-27 (displaying the terms of ProCD's license agreement).
137. See supra text accompanying notes 67-68 (stating the examples that the Seventh
Circuit used).
138. See supra text accompanying notes 66-67. These types of contracts are classified as
"contracts of adhesion." See 1 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1.4, at 13-15
(Joseph M. Perillo ed., rev. ed. 1993) (describing the history and types of adhesion contracts); 7 SAMUEL WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 900 at 29-30 (Walter H. Jaeger
ed., 3d ed. 1963) (discussing adhesion contracts).
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Alternatively, the second instance where a contract could have been
formed between ProCD and Zeidenberg is under the language of Section
2-606139 of the U.C.C. This section deals with situations where a purchaser is deemed to accept the terms of a transaction when the purchaser fails to reject the transaction's conditions after having an
opportunity to examine the product. 140 The Seventh Circuit reasoned
that Zeidenberg had an opportunity to inspect ProCD's software, particularly after he purchased three versions of the program and viewed the
license terms on the computer screen each time he downloaded the
software contents.1 4 1 Plus, Zeidenberg failed to "make an effective rejection"142 upon finding disagreement with those terms. Zeidenberg easily
could have returned the software he had purchased and, according to
ProCD's license terms, he would be entitled to a full refund. 143 But instead, he elected to download the contents of the software, thereby accepting the transaction. Hence, an application of the U.C.C. clearly
shows that a valid contract was formed between ProCD and Zeidenberg.
2. Federal Copyright Law Does Not Preempt The Terms Of ShrinkWrap Licenses
Perhaps the zealous opposition to the shrink-wrap license in ProCD,
and to shrink-wrap licenses in general, 144 stems from the argument that
139. See supra note 86 (defining U.C.C. Section 2-606).
140. See supra note 86 (defining U.C.C. Section 2-606).
141. See supra text accompanying notes 32 and 88-89 (discussing the numerous times
Zeidenberg purchased ProCD's software and failed to return the software after deciding to
not comply with the license terms).
142. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text (defining Sections 2-602 and 2-606
and discussing "failure to make effective rejection").
143. See supra note 26 (displaying the license terms allowing for a full refund to customers who do not want to comply with the terms); see also Puhala, supra note 3, at 1362-63
(stating that a software purchaser will have an opportunity to inspect the shrink-wrap
terms after purchasing the program and that the purchaser can return the software for a
refund if the purchaser does not agree with the terms of the license); Schwarz, supra note
133, at 264 (stating that a purchaser "can reject the offered terms by returning the goods
for a refund of the purchase price"). See generally David M. Mirchin, Wisconsin Case Could
Spur Changes in Software Licenses, CoRp. LEGAL TiMEs, June 1996, at 21 (giving presentday examples where consumers have the responsibility of returning the product if they do
not "find a product or its terms acceptable" and, in return, the consumer will receive a full
refund from the retailer).
144. There is another argument that the court in ProCD did not fully analyze federal
preemption because the Seventh Circuit did not consider the Copyright Clause of the U.S.
Constitution which applies to states through the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Netanel, supra note 16, at 383-84, 387; see Netanel, supra note 16, at 383-84, 387
nn.452 & 455; Toedt, supra note 5, at 622-26; see also Kaufman, supra note 126, at 223;
Lemley, supra note 3, at 1240. Professor Mark Lemley submitted an amicus curiae brief in
the ProCD case contending that shrink-wrap licenses should not be enforceable because
they are preempted by federal copyright law. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tele-
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provisions in the license agreement which purport to restrict software
purchasers' use of the program should be preempted by Section 301145 of
the Copyright Act; in essence, claiming that the ProCD decision was erroneous. 146 The two elements of Section 301 that must be met for preemption to occur are as follows: (1) the work at issue must be within the
subject matter of copyright, and (2) the right being asserted under state
law must be equivalent to rights assertable under copyright law.147
phone Serv., 499 U.S. 340 (1991); Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979);
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974); National Car Rental Sys., Inc. v.
Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426 (8th Cir. 1993). Furthermore, one commentator
has determined that due to the "existence of Section 301 ... the courts usually need not
gauge whether federal interest in this field is dominant... the courts may simply turn to
the explicit statutory language." MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPY-

RIGHT § 1.01[B] (1996) [hereinafter NMMER ON COPYRIGHT]. The Copyright Clause states
that "Congress shall have Power To promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2
(defining the Supremacy Clause). See generally Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519
(1977) (defining express field preemption); Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 546 (1973) (defining preemption and specifying that three types of preemption exist); Florida Lime and Avocado
Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963) (holding that preemption occurs when it is
"physically impossible" for a party to comply with both the federal and state statutes); Rice
v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947) (defining "implied field" preemption); Brief
Amicus Curiae of American Committee for Interoperable Systems in Support of Appellees
at 4, ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (No. 96-1139) n.452; Toedt,
supra note 5, at 623-24. However, this Casenote maintains that the court in ProCD did
analyze preemption, albeit indirectly, by applying cases that have dealt with the Copyright
Clause's principles. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1449, 1454-55
145. Preemption with Respect to Other Laws, 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1994). The relevant portions of the Preemption statute are the following:
(a) On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent
to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by
Section 106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by Sections 102
and 103, whether created before or after that date and whether published or unpublished, are governed exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled
to any such right or equivalent right in any such work under the common law or
statutes of any State.
(b) Nothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or remedies under the common
law or statutes of any State with respect to(1) subject matter that does not come within the subject matter of copyright as
specified by sections 102 and 103, including works of authorship not fixed in
any tangible medium of expression; or...
(3) activities violating legal or equitable rights that are not equivalent to any of
the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106.
Id. (emphasis added).
146. See generally Netanel, supra note 16, at 383-84, 387 n.455 (critiquing ProCD).
147. See National Car Rental, 991 F.2d at 426; see also Kemp, supra note 124, at 111-12.
But cf Maureen A. O'Rourke, Drawing the Boundary Between Copyright and Contract:
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However, there are two countervailing arguments which can negate
the potential for preemption. The first principle is the "extra element
test,"148 while the second argument contends that, in enacting Section
301, Congress did not intend to preempt contracts between private parties. 14 9 The seminal case that has dealt with, and endorsed, both theories is National Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Computer Assoc. Int'l, Inc.150
In National Car Rental, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit decided on the issue of whether the licensee's unauthorized use of
the licenser's computer programs, in violation of the contractual agreement, was a claim which should be preempted by the Copyright Act. 15 1
The unauthorized use alleged by the licenser consisted of using the computer program to process the data of third parties. 15 2 The Court held
that the "contractual restriction on use of the programs constitutes an
additionalelement making this cause of action not equivalent to a copyCopyright Preemption of Software License Terms, 45 DuKE L.J. 479, 518 (1995) (critiquing
Section 301 for its lack of clarity and cloudy legislative history, which leads to difficulty in
the courts' handling of preemption issues regarding state enforcement of private contractual rights); Rice, supra note 124, at 602 (stating that the "legislative history of § 301(b)
makes the scope and limits of statutory preemption less clear"). See generally Preemption
With Respect To Other Laws, 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1994).
148. See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.01[B][1], supra note 145, at 1-15 n.60.1; see also
National Car Rental, 991 F.2d at 431-33; Kaufman, supra note 126, at 230-32; O'Rourke,
supra note 148, at 523; Lemley, supra note 3, at 1257; cf Aronson, 440 U.S. at 262 (concluding that "state law is not displaced merely because the contract relates to intellectual property which may or may not be patentable").
149. See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.01[B][1] [a], supra note 145, at 1-16 to 1-20; see also
National CarRental, 991 F.2d at 433-34; O'Rourke, supra note 148, at 517-18; Kemp, supra
note 124, at 112; and Rice, supra note 124, at 602-04.
150. See National Car Rental, 991 F.2d at 431-34. But see Vault Corp. v. Quaid
Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 269 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that Louisiana's Software License
Enforcement Act was preempted by federal copyright law because it conflicted with rights
of computer program owners). See Rice, supra note 124, at 548 (stating that Vault
"dealt ...confusingly with copyright law preemption"); Bahr, supra note 124, at 162 (criticizing Vault for "blurr[ing] the distinction between licensees and owners"); Ryan, supra
note 4, at 2116 n.53 (reproaching the Vault decision for "misreading the Louisiana statute"
and "perpetuating the uncertainty surrounding shrink-wrap license enforceability"). One
commentator has hailed Vault as "[tihe most celebrated decision on intellectual property
preemption." Lemley, supra note 3, at 1256. However, Vault has been criticized severely
for its inadequate preemption analysis.
151. National Car Rental, 991 F.2d at 427. Four factors are used in determining
whether fair use exists. Id. at 428. First, the court looks to the "purpose and character of
the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes." Id. Second, the "nature of the copyrighted work" is determined. Id.
Third, the court determines the "amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation
to the copyrighted work as a whole." Id. Lastly, the court analyzes the "effect of the use
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work." Id. See generally Limitations on Exclusive Rights: Fair Use, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994) (allowing certain use of copyrighted materials which do not constitute infringement).
152. National Car Rental, 991 F.2d at 428.
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right action."
Likewise, in the case at bar, ProCD claimed that Zeidenberg used its
software in violation of the restrictive license. 154 The Seventh Circuit
adopted the same reasoning as applied in National Car Rental when the
court deduced that the rights created by contract are not equivalent to
the exclusive rights within the scope of copyright law. 155 Thus, the
could
Court correctly held that the terms of ProCD's license agreement
56
not be preempted by Section 301 of the Copyright Act.'
Secondly, the Eighth Circuit supported its conclusion by looking to
legislative history. 15 7 When copyright law was revised in 1976, the original draft of Section 301 contained Section 301(b)(3),1 5 8 which gave examples of causes of actions not preempted by the copyright laws. 5 9 One
such restriction was that breach of contract actions would not be pre153. Id. at 432 (emphasis added). The Eighth Circuit also stated that it "found no general rule holding breach of contract actions such as [the one in National Car Rental] preempted." Id. Another wording of the extra element states that there cannot be preemption
when a state-created cause of action requires an "extra element" in addition to the "acts of
reproduction, performance, distribution or display" such that the right lies outside the
scope of copyright. Id. at 431; see Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Swantz, 846 F.2d 923, 926 (4th
Cir. 1988) (holding that a breach of contract action "entails a distinct cause of action which
is clearly not within the subject matter of copyright but arises out of the implicit contractual provisions of the ... agreement").
154. See supra note 43 (discussing the use prohibited by ProCD's license).
155. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1454 (7th Cir. 1996). The Seventh Circuit
also cited other cases in dealing with this issue, but National Car Rental is the case most
on point. See generally Acorn Structures, 846 F.2d 923 (holding breach of home-design
agreement not preempted by copyright law because the contract "[arose] out of the implicit
contractual provisions of the design agreement").
156. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1455.
157. National Car Rental, 991 F.2d at 433. Numerous sources have observed that Congress intended Section 301 to not preempt contract law. See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 1.01[B][1][a], supra note 145, at 1-16 to 1-20; see also O'Rourke, supra note 148, at 51718; Rice, supra note 124, at 602-04.
158. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.01[B][1][a], supra note 145, at 1-16 to 1-17 & n.65 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 301 (b)(3); H.R. 4347, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966)):
(b) Nothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or remedies under the common
law or statutes of any State with respect to(3) activities violating rights that are not equivalent to any of the exclusive rights
within the general scope of copyright as specified by Section 106, including
breaches of contract,breaches of trust, invasion of privacy, defamation, and deceptive trade practices such as passing off and false representation.
17 U.S.C. § 301(b)(3) (1994) (emphasis added).
159. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 132 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5748;
see NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.01[B][1][a], supra note 145, at 1-17; see also National Car
Rental, 991 F.2d at 433, n.4; O'Rourke, supra note 148, at 217-18; and Rice, supra note 124,
at 603.
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empted by Section 301.160 However, in the final draft of the Copyright
Act, the proposed restrictions on Section 301 were deleted from the language of the statute. 16 1 Many observers have agreed with National Car
Rental in concluding that the deletion was not intended by Congress to
disavow the contractual restrictions on Section 301 preemption. 16 2 Congress' reasons for deleting the restrictive language from Section 301 was
to prevent confusion from the "addition of the tort of misappropriation to
the list of non-preempted causes of action." 163 Based on this reasoning,
the Eighth Circuit held that Congress did not intend the Copyright Act
164
to preempt actions for breach of contract.
Though the Seventh Circuit did not utilize this argument in its preemption analysis in ProCD,this Casenote agrees with the above reasoning that Congress did not intend Section 301 to preempt breach of
contract actions. As the Seventh Circuit wisely reasoned, it is "prudent
to refrain from adopting a rule that anything with the label 'contract' is
necessarily outside the preemption clause: the variations and possibilities are too numerous to foresee." 165 Thus Section 301 of the Copyright
Act does not preempt the license agreement between ProCD and
Zeidenberg. However, since the preemption issue is still quite uncertain,
a uniform guideline applied in every state, such as the proposed Article
2B, would do much to resolve whether breach of contract claims are preempted by Section 301.
B.

PROPOSED ARTICLE

2B:

CONSISTENT WITH

PRoCD WHILE

FORTIFYING SEVENTH CIRCUIT'S RULING

In this section, this Casenote applies the proposed Article 2B to
ProCD to show how the proposed article strengthens the Seventh Circuit's decision and validates shrink-wrap licenses. Admittedly, despite
the Seventh Circuit's holding in ProCD,the enforceability of shrink-wrap
160. National Car Rental, 991 F.2d at 433; see also Rice, supra note 124, at 603; cf
Kemp, supra note 124, at 112 (citing to a comment from § 301 as professing breach of contract actions to be precluded from preemption).
161. O'Rourke, supra note 148, at 518; Rice, supra note 124, at 603.
162. See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.01[BI[1][a], supra note 145, at 1-18 to 1-19; see also
supra note 161 (displaying commentators who agree with National Car Rental).
163. National CarRental, 991 F.2d at 433-34; see also O'Rourke, supra note 148, at 518;
Rice, supra note 124, at 603.
164. National Car Rental, 991 F.2d at 433-34; see O'Rourke, supra note 148, at 518;
Rice, supra note 124, at 604.
165. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1455 (7th Cir. 1996). See generally National Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 849-50 (2nd Cir. 1997) (following
ProCD's preemption analysis); Architectronics, Inc. v. Control Sys., Inc., 935 F. Supp. 425,
439 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (following ProCD'spreemption analysis).

1997]

ProCD, INC. V. ZEIDENBERG & ARTICLE 2B

licenses are still unresolved. 166 One main reason is because ProCD is
limited in its application to the states within the Seventh Circuit's jurisdiction. 167 Additionally, little statutory or case law deals with the current prevalence of software contracts, ranging from shrink-wrap licenses
to on-line agreements. 168 Thus, a national effort such as the proposed
Article 2B 1 6 9 would pave the way for resolving many of the complications
involved in the emerging area of software licenses.
Section 208170 of Article 2B deals with shrink-wrap licenses. 17 1
166. See Smith, supranote 133, at 597 (stating that the "efficacy of shrink-wrap licenses
remains as uncertain as ever").
167. See Dan Goodin, Seeking New Rules for a New Game; Commercial Code Meets the
DigitalAge, LEGAL TIMEs, Nov. 4, 1996, at 2 (noting that the ProCD holding is binding in
Illinois, Wisconsin, and Indiana only); see also supranote 125 (discussing ProCD as binding
only within the Seventh's Circuit's jurisdiction).
168. See Ramos & Verdon, supra note 4, at 2 (positing that "it has become standard
industry practice for software developers to rely on shrinkwrap licenses in mass-market
consumer transactions"); Fred M. Greguras & Sandy J. Wong, Software Licensing Flexibility Complements the Digital'Age, 11 COMPUTER LAw. 15 (1994) (stating that licensing practices are not keeping pace with the evolution of the computer industry); Wendy J. Gordon,
Assertive Modesty: An Economics of Intangibles, 94 CoLUM. L. REv. 2579, 2590 (1994) (concluding that "to maintain our current health, the legal regime has to change ... to protect
the practitioners in this newly valuable and newly vulnerable area" of computer law); see
also Ryan, supra note 4, at 2105 (detailing the statistics and effects of software piracy on
the software industry); Nimmer et al., supra note 133, at 292-93 (describing that the
'software industry accounts for almost 2.0% of the country's entire gross national product ... that software and related information services accounted for revenues in excess of
$93 billion in 1990... [and] has been growing"); Goodin, supra note 168, at 2 (describing
the present uncertainty in the validity of on-line contracts); Toedt, supra note 5, at 617
(discussing the ubiquitous shrink-wrap licenses and the increase in "click-on" Internet
agreements in the software industry); Towle, supra note 14, at 359 (stating that the "law
dealing with electronic commerce is not clear-especially for totally paperless
transactions").
169. See generally Licenses, U.C.C. Article 2B (Proposed Draft, Sept. 25, 1997) <http:ll
www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/ucc2/ucc2bjan.htm>.
170. Mass-Market Licenses, U.C.C. § 2B-208 (Proposed Draft, Sept. 25, 1997):
(a) Except as otherwise provided [in] Section 2B-209, a party adopts the terms of a
mass-market license for purposes of Section 2B-207(a) if the party agrees, including by manifesting assent, to the license before or in connection with the initial
performance or use of or access to the information. However, except as otherwise
provided in this section, a term [for which there was no opportunity to review
before payment of the contract fee is not adopted and] does not become part of the
contract if the party does not know of or manifest assent to the particular term
and the term creates an obligation or imposes a limitation that:
(1) the party proposing the form should know would cause an ordinary reasonable person acquiring this type of information in the general mass market to
refuse the license if that party knew that the license contained the particular

term; or
(2) conflicts with the negotiated terms of the agreement between the parties to
the license.
(b) Subsection (a)(1) does not exclude a term that:
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This provision is modeled after Section 211 of the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts, 172 which covers standardized agreements or adhesion contracts. 1 73 Furthermore, other provisions in Article 2B which affect
(1) states a limit on the licensee's use of the information which limit would
exist under intellectual property law in the absence of the contractual term;
(2) was disclosed in compliance with any federal or state law;
(3) was reasonably disclosed on the product packaging or otherwise before payment of the license fee, or was part of the product description; or
(4) becomes part of the contract under other provisions of this article.
(c) The court may exclude a term under this subsection (a)(1) only if it finds that
the term is bizarre or oppressive by industry standards or commercial practices,
abrogates or substantially conflicts with the nonstandard terms explicitly agreed
to by the parties to the license, or eliminates the dominant purpose of the transaction as agreed to by the parties to the license.]
Id. (emphasis added).
The reporter's notes mentions that Section 2B-208 is the portion of Article 2B that
"deals with all standard forms used in . . . mass market ... transactions." Mass-Market
Licenses, U.C.C. § 2B-208, Reporter's notes 1 (Proposed Draft, Sept. 25, 1997). Section 2B209 is the proposed analogue of Section 2-207 of the U.C.C., also known as the "battle of the
forms" provision. Compare Conflicting Terms, U.C.C. § 2B-209 (Proposed Draft, Sept. 25,
1997), with Additional Terms in Acceptance or Confirmation, U.C.C. § 2-207 (1996).
171. Definitions, U.C.C. § 2B-102(a)(25) (Proposed Draft, Sept. 25, 1997) (defining "license" as "a contract that authorizes, prohibits, or controls access to or use of information
and by its terms limits the scope of the rights granted or affirmatively grants less than all
rights in the information, whether or not the contract transfers title to a copy of the information and whether or not the rights granted are made exclusive to the licensee").
172. See Mass-Market License, U.C.C. § 2B-208, Reporter's notes 8 (Proposed Draft,
Sept. 25, 1997) (stating that Section 2B-208 in part adopts and expands on the principles of
the Section 211 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts). However, it must be noted that
Section 211 has only been adopted by a minority of the states. Id.
See also Restatement (Second) of Contracts: Standardized Agreements § 211 (1981).
This provision states the following:
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (3), where a party to an agreement signs or
otherwise manifests assent to a writing and has reason to believe that like writings are regularly used to embody terms of agreements of the same type, he adopts
the writing as an integrated agreement with respect to the terms included in the
writing.
(2) Such a writing is interpreted wherever reasonable as treating alike all those
similarly situated, without regard to their knowledge or understanding of the
standard terms of the writing.
(3) Where the other party has reason to believe that the party manifesting such
assent would not do so if he knew that the writing contained a particular term, the
term is not part of the agreement.
Id.
173. See supra notes 65 and 142 and accompanying text (discussing the advantages of
standardized agreements); Gomulkiewicz & Williamson, supra note 4, at 342-44 (discussing adhesion contracts and stating that "[t]he vast majority of contracts in the United
States are adhesion contracts"); Ryan, supra note 4, at 2117-35 (analyzing shrink-wrap
licenses as adhesion contracts); see also Standard Oil Co. of California v. Perkins, 347 F.2d
379 (9th Cir. 1965) (dealing with adhesion contracts); Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1177 (1983) (defining adhesion
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shrink-wrap licenses will be explored. 174 Generally, Section 2B-20817 5
governs the formation of mass-market licenses. 17 6 Before a mass-market license is formed, however, the terms must be "conspicuous," 1 77 there
contracts through seven common characteristics); W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARv. L. REV. 529, 529-30 (1971)
(stating that standard form contracts "account for more than ninety-nine percent of all the
contracts now made" and that their "predominance... is the best evidence of their necessity"); Edwin W. Patterson, The Delivery of a Life-Insurance Policy, 33 HARv. L. REV. 198,
222 (1919) (coining the term "contracts of 'adhesion'"); cf Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Crowd-Consumers and the Common Law Tradition, 31 U. Prrr. L. REV. 349
(1970) [hereinafter Leff, Unconscionabilityand the Crowd] (discussing unconscionability in
relation to adhesion contracts); Einhorn, supra note 4, at 516 n.24 (discussing the unconscionable disclaimer provisions of adhesion contracts).
174. See generally Definitions, U.C.C. § 2B-102(a)(7), (a)(28) & (a)(29) (Proposed Draft,
Sept. 25, 1997) (defining "conspicuous," "mass-market licenses" and "mass-market transaction," respectively); Unconscionable Contract or Clause, U.C.C. § 2B-111 (Proposed Draft,
Sept. 25, 1997); Manifesting Assent, U.C.C. § 2B-112 (Proposed Draft, Sept. 25, 1997); and
Opportunity to Review; Refund, U.C.C. § 2B-113 (Proposed Draft, Sept. 25, 1997).
175. Mass-Market Licenses, U.C.C. § 2B-208 (Proposed Draft, Sept. 25, 1997).
176. Definitions, U.C.C. § 2B-102(a)(28) (Proposed Draft, Sept. 25, 1997). This provision defines a "mass-market license" as follows: "[A] standard form that is prepared for and
used in a mass-market transaction." Id.
"Mass-market transaction" is defined in Article 2B as follows:
[A] transaction in a retail market involving information directed to the general
public as a whole under substantially the same terms for the same information,
and involving an end-user licensee that acquired the information under terms and
in a quantity consistent with an ordinary transaction in the general retail distribution. The term does not include:
(A) a transaction between parties neither of which is a consumer in which
either the total consideration for the particular item of information or the reasonably expected fees for the first year of an access contract exceeds [];
(B) a transaction in which the information is customized or otherwise specially
prepared for the licensee;
(C) a license of the right publicly to perform or display a copyrighted work; or
(D) a site license, or an access contract not involving a consumer.
Definitions, U.C.C. § 2B-102(a)(29) (Proposed Draft, Sept. 25, 1997).
177. Definitions, U.C.C. § 2B-102(7) (Proposed Draft, Sept. 25, 1997):
"Conspicuous", with reference to a term, means so written, displayed or presented
that a reasonable person against whom it is to operate ought to have noticed it or,
in the case of an electronic message intended to evoke a response by an electronic
agent without the need for review by an individual, in a form that would enable a
reasonably configured electronic agent to take it into account or react to it without
review of the message by an individual. A term is conspicuous if it is:
(A) a heading in all capitals (as NON-NEGOTIABLE BILL
greater in size to the surrounding text;

OF LADING)

equal or

(B) language in the body of a record or display in larger or other contrasting
type or color than other language;
(C) a term prominently referenced in the body or text of an electronic record or
display and can be readily accessed from the record or display;
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must be an "opportunity to review" 178 those terms, and a "manifestation
of assent" 179 to the terms must occur.
(D) language so positioned in a record or display that a party cannot proceed
without taking some additional action with respect to the term or the reference
thereto; or
(E) language readily distinguished in another manner.
Id. (emphasis added).
See generally Definitions, U.C.C. § 2B-102(a)(16) & (a)(17) (Proposed Draft, Sept. 25, 1997):
"Electronic agent" means a computer program or other electronic or automated
means used, selected, or programmed by a party to initiate or respond to electronic
messages or performances in whole or in part without review by an individual.
"Electronic message" means a record that, for purposes of communication to another person, is stored, generated, or transmitted by electronic means. The term
includes electronic date interchange, electronic or voice mail, facsimile, telex,
telecopying, scanning, and similar communications.
Id.
178. Opportunity to Review; Refund, U.C.C. § 2B-113 (Proposed Draft, Sept. 25,
(a) A party or electronic agent has an opportunity to review a record or term if it
made available in a manner designed to call it to the attention of the party and
permit review of its terms or to enable the electronic agent to react to the record
term.

1997):
is
to
or

(b) Except for a proposal to modify a contract, if a record is availablefor review
only after a contract fee is paid, a party has an opportunity to review only if it has a
right to a refund of any contract fees paid or to stop any payment already initiated
if it refuses the terms, discontinues use, and returns all copies. For multiple products transferred for a bundled price:
(1) if the party whose terms are refused is the transferor of the bundled product, the refund must be the entire bundled price on return of the entire bundled product, unless the licensee agrees to an allocation of the total fee
attributable to the rejected license; and
(2) if the party whose terms are refused was not the transferor of the entire
bundled product, the refund must be for the contract fee paid for the rejected
license or, if not separately stated, a reasonable allocation of the total fee attributable to the license.
Id. (emphasis added).
179. Manifesting Assent, U.C.C. § 2B-112 (Proposed Draft, Sept. 25, 1997):
(a) A party or electronic agent manifests assent to a record or term if, with knowledge of the terms or after having an opportunity to review the record or term under
Section 2B-113, it:
(1) authenticates a record or term, or engages in other affirmative conduct or
operations that the record conspicuously provides or the circumstances, including the terms of the record, clearly indicate will constitute acceptance of the
record or term; and
(2) had an opportunity to decline to authenticate the record or term or engage
in the conduct.
(b) The mere retention of information or a record without objection is not a manifestation of assent.
(c) If assent to a particular term in addition to assent to a record is required, a
party's conduct does not manifest assent to that term unless there was an opportunity to review the term and the authentication or conduct relates specifically to the
term.
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In ProCD, the license terms were "conspicuous" as there was a notice
on the outside of each software package referring to the terms inside the
package.1 8 0 There was also a notice of the terms in the user's manual
and on the computer screen.'18 Zeidenberg was afforded an "opportunity
to review" the license terms since the terms were called to Zeidenberg's
attention in the User Guide and on the computer screen,' 8 2 and since the
terms explicitly allowed a purchaser of ProCD's program to return the
product for a full refund.' 8 3 Thus, ProCD's license agreement met Article 2B's requirements for "conspicuous" terms and an "opportunity to review" the terms.
Zeidenberg also met Article 2B's "manifesting assent" i8 4 requirement when, after having an opportunity to review the license terms, he
"engaged in . . . affirmative conduct" constituting acceptance of the
terms. 185 The "affirmative conduct" was Zeidenberg's act of "clicking on
the displayed button" 8 6 on the computer screen before downloading
(d) A manifestation of assent may be proved in any manner, including by a showing that a procedure existed by which a party or an electronic agent must have
engaged in conduct or operations that manifests assent to the contract or term in
order to proceed further in the use it made of the information.
Id. (emphasis added).
180. See supra note 22 (discussing the ways that ProCD notified software purchasers of
the existence of a license and the placement of the actual license terms). See generally
Ryan, supra note 4, at 2128-29 (stating that consciousness of the shrink-wrap license is an
important factor in determining "whether the shrink-wrap license meets the degree of assent required to initiate a judicial review for fairness and commercial justification")..
181. See supra notes 26 and 27 and accompanying text (displaying and discussing the
license terms in the User Guide and on the computer screen).
182. See supra notes 26 and 27 and accompanying text (displaying and discussing the
license terms in the User Guide and on the computer screen).
183. See supra note 26 and 28 and accompanying text (showing that ProCD's license
terms allowed a purchaser to refund the software); see also Opportunity to Review; Refund,
U.C.C. § 2B-113, Reporter's notes 2 (Proposed Draft, Sept. 25, 1997) (reasoning that the
"opportunityto review can come at of before payment, or later. If the opportunity follows
payment, there is no opportunity to review unless the party can return the product and
receive a refund if it declines the terms of the record" (emphasis added)). See generally
Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, Computer Law: Shrink Wrap License Agreements, N.Y.
L.J., Apr. 9, 1996 (visited Feb. 3, 1997) <http://www.brmlaw.com/doclib/complaw.40996.html> (suggesting that shrink-wrap license producers should give purchasers
"clear and explicit notice" of license terms and a method for software purchasers to obtain
refunds in order to have valid contracts).
184. Manifesting Assent, U.C.C. § 2B-112, Reporter's notes 3 (Proposed Draft, Sept. 25,
1997) (stating that the requisite steps for "manifesting assent" are: (1) that "the party manifesting assent must.., be one that can bind the party being charged with the benefits or
limitations of the terms of the record and, where[ ] assent equates with acceptance, the
contract itself, (2) an "affirmative act", and (3) "an opportunity to review the record or
term").
185. Manifesting Assent, U.C.C. § 2B-112(a)(1) (Proposed Draft, Sept. 25, 1997).
186. Manifesting Assent, U.C.C. § 2B-112, Reporter's notes 3 (Proposed Draft, Sept. 25,
1997) (stating that "clicking on a displayed button in response to an on-screen description
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each of ProCD's programs.1 8 7
Turning to Section 2B-208 itself, subsection (a) covers situations
when a licensee1 88 is deemed to have accepted the terms of a mass-market license. 1 8 9 ProCDfits this requirement because Zeidenberg used the
software by "clicking on" the button on the computer screen when he
downloaded the software. 190 Subsection (a)(1) mandates that acceptance
of the terms under subsection (a) constitutes acceptance of all the terms
of the license unless the licensor knows that a reasonable licensee' 9 1
would refuse the objectionable terms had the licensee known of those
terms. 192 Subsection (a) further states that certain terms would still be
part of the license agreement if the licensee either manifested assent to
the terms or clearly knew of the terms before manifesting assent.193 In
ProCD, the license terms restricting a purchaser's use of the software
that this act constitutes acceptance of a particular term or an entire contract" would be an
affirmative act).
187. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (stating that the Seventh Circuit in
ProCD found that Zeidenberg could not download the software unless he "clicked" in agreement with the terms on the computer screen).
188. Definitions, U.C.C. § 2B-102(a)(26) (Proposed Draft, Sept. 25, 1997) (defining "licensee" to be "a transferee or any other person designated in, or authorized to exercise
rights as a licensee in a contract under this article, whether or not the contract constitutes
a license"). The Reporter's notes state that the terms "licensee" and "licensor" are subject
to generic usage. Definitions, U.C.C. § 2B-102, Reporter's notes 17 (Proposed Draft, Sept.
25, 1997).
189. Mass-Market Licenses, U.C.C. § 2B-208(a) (Proposed Draft, Sept. 25, 1997). The
Reporter's notes state that Section 2B-208 "deals with single-form cases." Mass-Market
Licenses, U.C.C. § 2B-208, Reporter's notes 6 (Proposed Draft, Sept. 25, 1997).
190. See supra note 186; see also Toedt, supra note 5, at 621 (stating that "Seventh
Circuit validated a common practice among software vendors, namely requiring users to
signify assent to license terms by... clicking on an 'I agree' button that was presented on
the screen").
191. See Mass-Market Licenses, U.C.C. § 2B-208, Reporter's notes 9 (Proposed Draft,
Sept. 25, 1997) (stating that this Draft of Article 2B "focuses on the perspective of the party
proposing the form with respect to an ordinary user of the information", as opposed to the
Restatements approach, which focuses on "the perception of the party proposing the form
as to the reactions of the recipient"; arguing that the Restatements approach of a "one [-]to[lone relationship creating an individualized perception would be unrealistic").
192. Mass-Market Licenses, U.C.C. § 2B-208(a)(1) (Proposed Draft, Sept. 25, 1997). Refusal terms are "terms that the proposing party has reason to know would cause a refusal
of the license if the licensee were aware of the terms." Mass-Market Licenses, U.C.C. § 2B208, Reporter's notes 8 (Proposed Draft, Sept. 25, 1997). Subsection (a)(1) prevents "the
creation of terms that contradict the basics of the agreement without giving the assenting
party fair notice of the terms." Mass-Market Licenses, U.C.C. § 2B-208, Reporter's notes 7
(Proposed Draft, Sept. 25, 1997) (emphasis added).
193. Mass-Market Licenses, U.C.C. § 2B-208(a) (Proposed Draft, Sept. 25, 1997). Subsection (a) "places two general restrictions on the enforceability of terms in the mass market license in situations where the term is not known by or called to the party's attention
and assented to by the party." Mass-Market Licenses, U.C.C. § 2B-208, Reporter's notes 7
(Proposed Draft, Sept. 25, 1997).
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would qualify as a term that Zeidenberg would refuse had he known of
the terms. However, subsection (b)(3) states that those terms are binding upon Zeidenberg because Zeidenberg was made aware of those terms
and manifested his assent to them.1 9 4 The terms were "reasonably disclosed on the product packaging" which Zeidenberg had a chance to view
"before payment of the license fee," and were "part of the product
19 5
description."
Subsection (b)(4) holds that terms enforceable under another provision of Article 2B could not be excluded from the license. 19 6 One provision of Article 2B that may come into play is Section 2B-111,1 97 which
covers unconscionable contracts or terms. 198 Though the ProCD court
did not need to analyze this issue, other software producers should keep
unconscionability in mind when writing shrink-wrap licenses. Otherwise, a court has the option to "refuse to enforce the contract, enforce the
remainder of the contract without the term, or so limit the application of
the term as to avoid any unconscionable result." 199
Subsection (b)(1) asserts that exclusive rights granted under intellectual property laws are not precluded by subsection (a)(1). 20 0 This subsection essentially pronounces that Section 2B-208 does not hinder
194. Mass-Market Licenses, U.C.C. § 2B-208(b)(3) (Proposed Draft, Sept. 25, 1997).
Subsection (b) describes situations in which terms would not be excluded from mass-market licenses. Mass-Market Licenses, U.C.C. § 2B-208, Reporter's notes 11 (Proposed Draft,
Sept. 25, 1997).
195. Id.; see supra notes 180-82 and accompanying text (discussing instances when
Zeidenberg had opportunities to view the license terms).
196. Mass-Market Licenses, U.C.C. § 2B-208(b)(4) (Proposed Draft, Sept. 25, 1997). In
particular, the Reporter's notes refer to "conspicuous language" provisions. Mass-Market
Licenses, U.C.C. § 2B-208, Reporter's notes 11 (Proposed Draft, Sept. 25, 1997).
197. Unconscionable Contract or Term, U.C.C. § 2B-111 (Proposed Draft, Sept. 25,
1997).
198. See generally Puhala, supra note 3, at 1378 (discussing unconscionability and concluding that "courts probably will uphold the provisions of shrink-wrap licenses if the
shrink-wrap license becomes part of the sales contract"); Leff, Unconscionabilityand the
Crowd, supra note 174, at 349 (analyzing the unconscionability clause in U.C.C.);
O'Rourke, supra note 148, at 532 (discussing procedural and substantive unconscionability); Einhorn, supra note 4, at 516-17 (discussing unconscionability of disclaimer provisions
in adhesion contracts); Ryan, supra note 4, at 2122-23 n.86 (discussing development of unconscionability); and Schwarz, supra note 133, at 276 (stating that unconscionability is
used to prevent "oppression and unfair surprise").
199. Unconscionable Contract or Term, U.C.C. § 2B-111(a) (Proposed Draft, Sept. 25,
1997).
200. Mass-Market Licenses, U.C.C. § 2B-208(b)(1) (Proposed Draft, Sept. 25, 1997). The
Reporter's notes warn that Section 2B-208 "does not validate terms outside what rights the
licensor would have under copyright and patent." Mass-Market Licenses, U.C.C. § 2B-208,
Reporter's notes 11 (Proposed Draft, Sept. 25, 1997). The intent of the Drafter's of Article
2B is to "validate contract terms that merely implement a copyright owner's exclusive
rights and reflect conditions already established by federal property law." Id.
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federal preemption. Lastly, subsection (c) describes the only situations
in which courts may exclude terms under subsection (a)(1). 20 1 The most
relevant provision refers to terms that are "bizarre or oppressive by industry standards or commercial practices." 20 2 The court in ProCD did
not address this issue, but the Reporter's notes to Section 2B-208 suggest
that "if ... [the licensor] wish[es] to impose a bizarre term, the only safe
is
procedure . . . [the licensor] can adopt entails one in which that term
20 3
brought to the licensee's attention and assented to by the licensee."
Thus, Section 2B-208, combined with other provisions of Article 2B,
would explicitly enforce shrink-wrap licenses. As applied to the facts
from ProCD, the shrink-wrap license written by ProCD would also be
valid and enforceable under Article 2B. Hence, it is evident that the Seventh Circuit came to a conclusion that comports with Article 2B.
VI.

CONCLUSION

If enacted, Article 2B should quell the dispute concerning shrinkwrap licenses. 20 4 Given that mass-market licenses are omnipresent in
the software industry, to hold such contracts invalid would be disastrous.
There must be a legal standard which courts can apply to enforce such
contracts, particularly in light of the large amount of agreements formed
over the Internet. 20 5 ProCD has led the way by enforcing shrink-wrap
201. Mass-Market Licenses, U.C.C. § 2B-208(c) (Proposed Draft, Sept. 25, 1997).
202. Id.
203. Mass-Market Licenses, U.C.C. § 2B-208, Reporter's notes 10 (Proposed Draft, Sept.
25, 1997).
204. See Dawan Stanford, Comment, How the Uniform Commercial Code is Being Updated to Handle the Information Economy, RECORDER, July 10, 1996, at 4 (stating that the
"enactment of Article 2B will eliminate many of the problems and uncertainties in license
contracts"); see also Raymond T. Nimmer, IntangiblesContracts:Thoughts of Hubs, Spokes,
and Reinvigorating Article 2, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1337 (1994) [hereinafter Nimmer,
Intangibles Contracts](detailing the need to revise Article 2 due to the evolution in the way
transactions occur); James B. Gambrell et al., Whelan and Altai: ProtectingSoftware by
Abusing 'Idea'and 'Expression,' 11 COMPUTER LAw. 9 (1994) (hypothesizing that the protection available for software may need an overhaul); Ryan, supra note 4, at 2107 (stating that
present legal remedies do not afford software publishers the "necessary degree of protection"); Donald H. Vish, Under the Proposed Article 2B, the Uniform Commercial Code
Would Finally and Properly Cover Information Licenses and Software Products, LEGAL
TIMEs, Aug. 19, 1996, at 25 (concluding that "the instances in which Article 2B departs
from historical commercial rules are well-reasoned and well-defined").
205. See generally Moore & Hadden, supra note 13, at 1 (proposing that on-line agreements stand a far greater chance of being enforced than "hard copy" shrink-wrap licenses);
Netanel, supra note 16, at 305-06 (surmising that "database access contracts would more
closely resemble the standard contractual meeting of the minds than do shrinkwrap
licenses and thus might have a greater chance of surviving the contract law challenged that
have until recently thwarted shrinkwrap licenses").
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licenses. 20 6 Though the revisions of Article 2B should be completed
soon, 20 7 it will be subject to an extensive adoption process by each
state.20 8 Therefore, the ALI, NCCUSL and the states should enact Article 2B immediately to ensure that adequate, uniform protection is afforded to agreements formed under shrink-wrap licenses.
Joseph C. Wang

206. See Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, Shrinkwrap Licenses Revisited, N.Y. L.J.,
Aug. 13, 1996, at 3 (concluding that the impact of ProCD may "extend beyond consumer
software transactions and could help to facilitate many types of agreements formed online").
207. Nimmer, Remarks, supra note 11. Professor Nimmer stated that he expects the
revisions of Article 2B to be finished within the next three to nine months. Id. Additionally, Professor Nimmer predicted that "[by] the end of this decade, every article of the
U.C.C. will be revised and at least two new U.C.C. articles will have been promulgated."
Nimmer, Intangibles Contracts,supra note 201, at 1337; see also Jean Braucher, The UCC
Gets Another Rewrite, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1996, at 66 (describing the provisions of the U.C.C.
that will be amended due to the "transition from an economy based on manufacturing to
one built on services and information").
208. Braucher, supra note 203, at 67 (describing the process by which the code will be
revised and expanded). A drafting committee is first assembled, which comprises of NCCUSL members, ALI representatives, an American Bar Association ("ABA") adviser and a
reporter. Id.; see also Vish, supra note 201, at 25 (stating that the drafting committee
consists of 15 members, three of which are from ALI, which leaves 10 committee members
from NCCUSL); Goodin, supra note 168, at 2 (elaborating on the reporter's role-to handle
competing interest and oversee the final draft-and discussing the characteristics that
qualifies a person as a reporter-e.g., "a good listener... [who] works well with all interests and is seen as being fair-minded"); and Nimmer, Remarks, supra note 11 (stating that
Professor Raymond Nimmer is presently the Reporter for the Drafting Committee of U.C.C.
Article 2B). After the drafting committee proposes and refines the statutory language, the
full ALI and NCCUSL must approve the revisions. Braucher, supra note 203, at 67. Then,
each state must enact the provisions. Id.; see Vish, supra note 201, at 25; CommercialLaw
Update Hits Rough Spot Over Licensing: Does UCC 2B Favor Software Vendors Over
Users?, 4 VOORHEES REP. 16 (1996); see also Goodin, supra note 168, at 2 (stating that
ratification by all 50 states could take more than three years). Interestingly, the committee's meetings are open to the public.
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